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GATEKEEPERS, CULTURAL CAPTIVES, OR
KNAVES?: CORPORATE LAWYERS THROUGH
DIFFERENT LENSES
Donald C. Langevoort*
INTRODUCTION
Decades ago, I read an interview with Clark Clifford, the revered
Washington lawyer who was facing widely publicized charges that he
knowingly aided a corporate client (a foreign banking institution) in violating
federal regulatory disclosure laws.1 Clifford ended the interview by
acknowledging that any reasonable person hearing the facts would come
away with only two possible interpretations: either Clifford was thoroughly
venal or incredibly stupid.2 By all accounts he was neither, and thus was
asking the reader to reach deeper for a more sympathetic understanding of
his behavior.
This was a time when the ugly domestic savings and loan scandals of the
1980s were just winding down. Observers were famously asking “where
were these professionals?” to demand more serious legal and disciplinary
sanctions against the so-called gatekeepers who enabled (or closed their eyes
to) so much shameless financial wrongdoing.3 As a corporate/securities
scholar, I was fascinated by the gatekeeper question and, having been at the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before academia, instinctively
weighed in on the arguments largely on the pro-enforcement side. But I was
also taken by Clifford’s lament. At the time, I was doing research on the
application of social and cognitive psychology to various topics in business
and finance, from which I eventually surmised that there might be good
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This
Essay was prepared for the Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 11, 2019, at Fordham University
School of Law. My thanks to the participants at the Stein Colloquium for their comments and
the stimulating conversation.
1. David E. Rosenbaum, The B.C.C.I. Scandal; Charm for Plebeians and Patricians,
N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/30/business/the-bcci-scandalcharm-for-plebeians-and-patricians.html [https://perma.cc/S3LF-NG25].
2. See id.
3. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). The
term “gatekeeper” had caught on in academic analysis to describe the admixture of legal and
reputational threats that would cause influential persons (particularly investment bankers,
auditors, and lawyers) to refuse to allow clients and others to violate the law by withholding
essential services. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a ThirdParty Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
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psychological explanations for why a lawyer like Clifford could be so close
to a client’s situation that he could miss wrongdoing risks that would seem
plain from a greater distance. So in 1993, I published a law review article
that examined the state of mind standards under the federal securities laws
for professional aiding and abetting (the most common charge against
lawyers), making the claim that highly engaged lawyers may not always have
the level of actual awareness necessary for liability in light of then
contemporary psychological research, circumstantial evidence of complicity
notwithstanding.4
To my knowledge, this was the first article to apply social cognition
research to the professional responsibilities of corporate lawyers.5 For a
decade, at least, a handful of legal scholars had been mining what was coming
to be known as behavioral economics for tractable insights on judgment and
decision-making to apply to various other legal subjects,6 so my move in this
direction was not entirely pioneering. But the corporate field posed unique
challenges for a user of these materials. After years of passive-aggressive
disregard, there was now palpable resistance from orthodox law and
economics scholars arguing that the heuristics, biases, and other cognitive
traits that were being identified with such fanfare had no sustainability in
competitive marketplace settings that bountifully rewarded rationality and
harshly punished flawed thinking.7
Fast forward to today, where work in psychology and behavioral
economics is regularly invoked by scholars writing about lawyers’
professional responsibility, corporate and otherwise.8 To adherents, at least,
4. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral
Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Client Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993). I was
still pro-enforcement, and so this inference was by way of calling for reform with a more
sophisticated approach to intentionality. I extended the argument shortly thereafter in Donald
C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and
Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997) (focusing on group-level biases).
5. There was already influential literature on the “law and society” movement looking at
the beliefs and behaviors of corporate lawyers by sociologists and cultural anthropologists,
including Robert Nelson’s monumental book Partners with Power. See generally ROBERT L.
NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM
(1988); infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
6. In 1998, I published a literature review of this early work, which had already grown
in prominence and quantity. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1499 (1998).
7. See Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and
Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 319–24 (1986). Richard Posner
later elaborated on this theme. Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998).
8. See, e.g., PAUL BREST & LINDA H. KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2010); Paula
Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics Lessons for Corporate Counsel, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
975 (2019); see also Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411
(2008); Catherine G. O’Grady, Behavioral Legal Ethics, Decision Making, and the New
Attorney’s Unique Perspective, 15 NEV. L.J. 671 (2015); Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral
Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639 (2015); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and
Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941 (2007); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Behavioral
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there seem to be many possibilities for adaptive biases to affect marketplace
behavior and the actions of economic elites without being washed out by the
detergent of market discipline and efficiency. Behavioral ethics has now
become an academic subdiscipline of its own.9
For all this progress, however, I am not sure that the particular questions
about lawyers that bothered me long ago have been well answered. In my
writing on the subject, I still hold to the view that various cognitive (and
cultural) biases lead many lawyers—including, and maybe even especially,
elite ones—to deflect, normalize, and rationalize actions that are either illegal
or unethical without compromising their internal self-image as good,
responsible people and good, responsible lawyers.10 The unifying theme is
the extraordinary pervasiveness of self-deception and hypocrisy in
professional and other high-status lives. That said, I am still sensitive to the
claim that the point of view I take—in the now popular genre of “good people
do bad things”—is naïve. Maybe what I attribute to moral blind spots is more
often a conscious and thus blameworthy form—maybe even a sociopathic
choice—of giving into pressure and temptation.11
This lingering unease was pricked by a recent pair of articles by two British
researchers, Steven Vaughan and Emma Oakley, who spoke with a number
of elite London-based solicitors about the role of ethics in high-end corporate
practice.12 While no one, of course, said they would ever enable unlawful
behavior by a client (and might even draw the line at extremely troubling but
lawful client behavior), they seemed otherwise completely disinterested in
any further public-regarding ethical dimension to their practice.13 Clients are
in charge: full stop. The authors saw some psychological distancing going
on but were struck by how candidly the elite lawyers roundly rejected the
Ethics Meets Legal Ethics, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 75 (2015); Jennifer K. Robbennolt &
Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2013).
9. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85, 89–91
(2012); Robbennolt, supra note 8, at 76–77.
10. For my book-length treatment of these ideas as they play out in business and finance
generally, see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL
STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (2016); on in-house lawyers in
particular, see Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers,
Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495.
11. I was also jolted reading an article by a research team including Linda Klebe Treviño,
a preeminent organizational behaviorist, describing the behavior of sales managers at a
particular firm who altered reporting routines to falsify information about performance sent
up to senior management. See generally Niki A. den Nieuwenboer et al., Middle Managers
and Corruptive Routine Translation: The Social Production of Deceptive Performance, 28
ORG. SCI. 781 (2017). They did this through pressure on their subordinates. While this setting
was ripe for ambiguation and cognitive distortion of the sort now largely taken for granted in
management studies, the article reports a disturbingly high degree of candor that what they
were doing was wrong, yet they were doing it anyway. Id. at 781.
12. See generally Emma Oakley & Steven Vaughan, In Dependence: The Paradox of
Professional Independence and Taking Seriously the Vulnerabilities of Lawyers in Large
Corporate Law Firms, 46 J.L. & SOC’Y 83 (2019); Steven Vaughan & Emma Oakley, “Gorilla
Exceptions” and the Ethically Apathetic Corporate Lawyer, 19 LEGAL ETHICS 50 (2016).
13. See Oakley & Vaughan, supra note 12, at 106; Vaughan & Oakley, supra note 12, at
60–61.
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idea that ethics has (or should have) much relevance at all to their work, given
so much professional rhetoric otherwise.14 If apathy prevails, maybe the
“good people” category deserves to be truncated when it comes to
responsibility for bad things, suggesting something close to conscious
indifference.
These are big issues, and this is a small Essay. Here, I simply want to
move things forward in the study of the professional responsibility of
corporate lawyers in two ways that are somewhat related. One is to push
harder on consciousness by looking more closely at the lengthy continuum—
not a binary yes/no—in the awareness of wrongdoing risk as heavily
influenced by the “slippery slope.” That is a layman’s intuition put to use
well beyond academic research:
armchair philosophers have long
understood that the road to hell is not only paved with good intentions but
starts in small, often unconscious steps that gradually grow larger and harder
to stop. Looking at corporate lawyers’ professional responsibility through
this lens has some interesting and, as far as I can tell, underexplored
implications that help us understand the source of ethical apathy.
The other is to consider the possibility that diminished interest in
gatekeeping ethics among private practitioners might be offset by greater
embrace of the possibility by in-house lawyers. The remarkable ascension
of the general counsel in authority and status in the corporate setting is
something many scholars and practitioners have written about.15 But there
has emerged in recent years a new lens for the empirical examination of
corporate lawyers, taking the tools of financial economics to seek
correlations (and maybe causation) between identifiable lawyer
characteristics and outcomes for the company in terms of (for example) its
legal exposure.16 There is some hopeful news in this research, albeit heavily
contingent on the company’s governance structure, broadly conceived. So I
end by suggesting that, while the effort in normative legal ethics to enlist
corporate lawyers in more than a legalistic conception of gatekeeping has
failed, corporate governance and corporate ethics—surprisingly, perhaps—
have some potential to enable gatekeeping general counsel in a way that
filters down to the demand for ethically sensitive outside counsel as well.
Good gatekeepers are not necessarily facing extinction, though stronger
species preservation efforts are surely in order.
I. BEHAVIORAL ETHICS AND SLOW DEGRADATION
The diagnosis that would-be gatekeepers have surrendered to ethical
apathy should surprise no one. As a matter of simple economics, clients pay
the bills and normally prefer that the professionals they retain facilitate—not
frustrate—their chosen ends. Intense competition among skilled lawyers
14. See Vaughan & Oakley, supra note 12, at 74–75.
15. See, e.g., Ben W. Heineman, The Rise of the General Counsel, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
27, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/09/the-rise-of-the-general-counsel [https://perma.cc/2B8NHXXC].
16. See infra notes 63–81 and accompanying text.
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forces them into acquiescence. Absent countervailing regulatory or
disciplinary pressures, what is left is professional integrity, which too easily
gives way to norms that are more conducive to competitive success.
Numerous legal scholars have told versions of this devolution story, from
varying disciplinary perspectives.17
To be sure, we would not expect corporate lawyers to willfully facilitate
client fraud when it exposes them to serious legal or reputational risks. When
and why that occasionally happens anyway is the Clark Clifford problem.
And as mentioned earlier, the puzzle there is one of good faith: is what goes
on cognitively really about blind spots or instead something more culpable?
Answering that addresses both the legal issue when the lawyer seems to have
rendered substantial assistance to client misbehavior and—in a larger
category of situations—when professional judgments lead apathetic lawyers
to sit idly while clients threaten the common good, lawfully or not. In this
Part, I revisit the culpability problem that has for so long bothered me.
The behavioral approach to ethics is a lively field with a progressive
research agenda that identifies much behavior that is still only dimly
understood, so both broad generalizations and confident conclusions are
unwise. But in a rough sense it deserves the organizing description that it is
about good people doing bad things—there are not so many bad apples as
bad barrels.18 That is to say, ordinary (nonsociopathic) people are naturally
inclined to be reasonable and honest but easily tempted otherwise by selfserving inferences, especially in the face of strong situational incentives and
pressures.19 People cheat less than cold economic calculations would
suggest but more than they should under common ethical norms.20 The main
research task is to discover, by manipulating situational variables, how and
when ordinary behavior turns better or worse than this baseline. The results
over the past four decades or so provide a rich body of insights. There are
both popular and scholarly books available; for lawyers and legal scholars,
Yuval Feldman’s recent The Law of Good People treats the subject in
depth.21
For our purposes, perhaps the most interesting question in behavioral
ethics is one of consciousness: how much in the way of ethical and legal
judgment and decision-making happens outside of consciousness, so that
what is processed within awareness is something of an illusion. The research
suggests that there is a large amount of automaticity to mental processing,
17. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006); Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008); Ronald J. Gilson,
The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869
(1990).
18. See Linda Klebe Treviño et al., (Un)Ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 635, 648–49 (2014).
19. See id. at 647–48.
20. See id. at 642–43.
21. See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE
FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011); YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW
OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018).
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only partly (if that) subject to the force of cognitive will.22 This, in turn, has
a strong temporal dimension. Depending on situational circumstances, many
ethical challenges are initially processed so that the ethical dimension is
hidden from awareness, not triggering moral anxiety at all.23 This is pure
blind-spot territory, such that the individual or group’s good intentions go
unchallenged.24 Sooner or later, the ethical danger cues may come closer to
consciousness but dismissed or downplayed by a combination of natural
cognitive conservatism and motivated inference (we are often slow to
understand what we do not really want to know).25 This is often referred to
as ethical fading.26 With more evidence, there may finally be some
awareness, although rationalizations and denial may still blunt full realization
of what now may be an ethical or legal mess. If and when there finally is a
more unfiltered awareness, the actor is in deep. Then, often enough, comes
the conscious (though still probably rationalized) cover-up.27
This temporal continuum is a challenge to lawyers and ethicists used to
looking for simple accounts of dispositional blameworthiness. Awareness is
gradual and delayed, often until it is too late to avoid harm. This is a misfit
with many legal constructs based explicitly on conscious awareness,28 like
bad faith, and certainly points in the direction of lessened culpability even
though the decision might be described as negligent or perhaps even reckless.
This is why behavioralists use the good people/bad things locution. Of
course, we can and often do blame people anyway, making an example of
them as a lesson to others who might then be more cognitively awoke. But
deterrence doesn’t necessarily work that way absent draconian threats, inthe-moment interventions, or intrusive monitoring, all of which generate
their own problems. In day-to-day routines, it is hard to instill more ethical
awareness in people who are wedded to the assumption that they are good.
Moreover, the act of judging awareness after the fact of some ethical failure
is hopelessly biased by hindsight, which makes it hard to learn from
experience. Ongoing work in organizational behavior and compliance design
tries hard to overcome all this, and there are some promising steps.29 But it

22. Ann Tenbrunsel & David Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in
Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 232 (2004).
23. See id. at 225–26, 233.
24. See id. at 233.
25. See id. at 230, 233.
26. See generally id.
27. For a classic early work in social psychology describing the institutional manifestation
of this, see Barry Staw, Knee Deep in Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a
Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 27, 28 (1976).
28. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 10, at 43–45.
29. See Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—and How to Fix
Them, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/why-complianceprograms-fail [https://perma.cc/MXJ3-Z64X]; see also David Hess, Ethical Infrastructure
and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from
Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317 (2017).

2020]

GATEKEEPERS, CULTURAL CAPTIVES, OR KNAVES?

1689

remains a challenge, especially in high-velocity business environments
populated by aggressive risk-takers.30
There is so much more to be said about all of this, but the interested reader
has more than enough to choose from elsewhere to go more deeply into the
research. As noted at the outset, my question is about relatively how often
this blind spot account accurately describes problematic ethical and legal
behavior as opposed to a more deliberate, consciously calculated
explanation. We can assume that there are plenty of instances of both, but is
there anything to say about the relative distribution? Asking wrongdoers to
recall their thought processes—the approach of Eugene Soltes’s important
book Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal31—is
helpful, but one gets the impression that wrongdoers (especially after a period
of punishment) might not really have the self-insight or recollection to
answer accurately and may be motivated to construct an account in hindsight
that serves purposes other than accuracy. Recall that even with significantly
impaired awareness at the beginning of and through much of the course of
the misbehavior, the misconduct may well end with some recognition of
guilt, however softened by lingering rationalizations. Even with that, Soltes
finds substantial variations in the stories, some more consistent with the
cognitive approach,32 others more jaded.
A. The Slippery Slope
In making the case for impaired awareness, I have long found the idea of
the slippery slope compelling. As noted earlier, it is the idea—amply found
in folk wisdom as well as social science research—that most people will not
often go immediately from their ordinary good behavior to serious
impropriety, even under strong situational pressure.33 But they will engage
in minor transgressions, finding ample ways to justify the small steps as not
really improper at all.34 Once the first step is taken, however, the line as to
what is permissible moves because of the rationalization—now that becomes
the baseline. The next temptation is measured not by the starting point but
by the revised definition of ethical or legal acceptability. And so on, as what
is done becomes more harmful. This bears substantial kinship with the
temporal account for delayed awareness and draws from work on
commitment biases, cognitive dissonance, and the like for why each
subsequent step becomes easier (and stopping so much harder) down an
30. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 952
(2017). This is a particular challenge in internal efforts to deter high-impact white collar
crime. See Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 GA. L. REV. 129, 139–
40 (2018).
31. See generally EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITECOLLAR CRIMINAL (2016).
32. Id. at 58 (neuroscience perspectives); id. at 155 (cognitive dissonance); id. at 257–58
(self-deception).
33. See Treviño et al., supra note 18, at 647–48.
34. David T. Welsh et al., The Slippery Slope: How Small Ethical Transgressions Pave
the Way for Larger Future Transgressions, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 114, 115 (2015).

1690

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

increasingly steep and icy slope. The underlying idea is a gradual descent
into corruption, not a discrete choice.
Much work in behavioral ethics invokes this kind of gradualism. The
famous social psychologist John Darley drew from it in a notable law review
article describing how corporations become miscreants.35 Of particular note
to corporate lawyers, a study by two financial economists, Catherine Schrand
and Sarah Zechman, looked at companies that found themselves in legal
trouble with the SEC and found fairly consistent patterns of accounting
choices that at the outset were plausible (if aggressive), with intermediate
steps that only gradually over time crossed the line to financial
misreporting.36 That is hard data evidence for the behavioral side.
Schrand and Zechman found something else interesting. There is lots of
social science evidence for many corporate executives exhibiting an excess
of self-confidence and overoptimism, an inflated sense of personal (or senior
management team) efficacy.37 Firms with overconfident chief executive
officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs), they found, were more
likely to take the first steps, and end up in trouble.38 That makes sense: to
the genuinely overconfident, the first steps (aggressive recognition of income
or minimized costs) would be perceived as honest and realistic.
Overconfidence has emerged as the best example in behavioral economics of
an adaptive bias—a trait that is not entirely rational but nonetheless promotes
competitive success.39 It is thus a counterexample to the idea that
marketplace pressures wash out all biases that interfere with the economists’
assumption of rationality.40
I have long relied on both overconfidence and the slippery slope in making
In a strikingly evocative way,
the case for behavioral ethics.41
neuroscientists have now joined in.42 Using magnetic imaging of the brain
during ethics-related laboratory experiments, they have found that the
amygdala is normally strongly activated by ethical stress (pressures to
misbehave).43 That emotions-driving portion of the brain plays a big role in
doing what is right.44 But if there is a small step toward cheating, the level
of activation goes down slightly in the next opportunity.45 This goes on and

35. See generally John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious
Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177 (2005).
36. See generally Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L. C. Zechman, Executive
Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311
(2012).
37. See id. at 312.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 313.
40. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
41. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 10, at 26–27, 35–37.
42. See generally Neil Garrett et al., The Brain Adapts to Dishonesty, 19 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 1727 (2016). For a commentary, see generally Jan B. Engelmann & Ernst
Fehr, The Slippery Slope of Dishonesty, 19 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1543 (2016).
43. See Garrett et al., supra note 42, at 1731.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1727, 1731.
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on, down the slippery slope.46 Gradually, the amygdala’s electrical energy
dims to indifference.47
The study of slippery slopes in behavioral ethics tends to be focused on
discrete choices that lead to a wrongful act. In that framing, it does weigh in
on the side of diminished or delayed awareness. But it raises an interesting
question if we extend the timeline. Suppose, over many years perhaps, a
person makes gradual ethical compromises down the slippery slope in pursuit
of competitive success, without suffering any serious penalty. When ethical
(or legal) stresses arise again, does the decision-making reset to the starting
point of innocence or instead, do all the prior compromises accumulate,
cognitively, so that they are essentially starting out partway down, already
unbalanced?
If so, it raises the possibility that character becomes corrupted by earlier
ethical compromises even when unrelated to the particular dilemma at hand.
Then the question becomes whether this priming brings the person sooner to
an actual awareness that they are cheating, as they have done before, or
whether this whole process stays out of consciousness. If the former, it
suggests that habits of compromise gradually impair character generally,
perhaps with less cognitive resistance to the implications. In other words,
people become willing and able to admit that they were cheating from the
start but had largely stopped caring (i.e., ethical apathy).
B. Corporate Lawyers
We now turn this account specifically to the world of corporate lawyers
and their capacity as gatekeepers. Though I am by no means suggesting that
ethical compromises are everyday occurrences, lawyers do seem to get into
legal and ethical muck often enough.48 A 60 Minutes sting operation that
showed multiple New York lawyers more than ready to help hide the
unsavory identity of a prospective client wanting to engage in a high-end real
estate transaction (and actually led to bar discipline against some of them)
surely resonated among members of the public inclined to see lawyers as
fixers and hired guns.49
Those of us who have spent time with (or were) corporate lawyers know
that the public perceptions are stereotypes and that the vast majority of
corporate lawyers present as “good people.” This invites us to think in terms
of behavioral explanations when—like Clark Clifford—they are accused of
doing bad things. But if it were possible, what would a deep moral census of
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. For example, insider trading even when the lawyer in question is the company’s
insider trading compliance officer. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Charges Former Senior Attorney at Apple with Insider Trading (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-10 [https://perma.cc/MH5P-94J5].
49. 60 Minutes:
Anonymous, Inc. (CBS television broadcast Jan. 31, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hidden-camera-investigation-money-laundering-60minutes/ [https://perma.cc/EUJ3-A9WM]. This led to bar disciplinary proceedings against
some of those caught in the sting.
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corporate lawyers reveal? How willing are lawyers to intentionally step over
the legal line to aid a client’s economic interests, after having made the
Holmesian “bad man” risk calculation as to both client and self? Or assuming
that legal and reputational risk has properly been managed, how many of
them would do harm to another simply because the client’s self-interest
called for it? The latter recreates the laboratory situation that started the field
of behavioral ethics:
measuring the incidence of cheating under
circumstances where there are real gains to be had and zero chance of
detection. I have no idea what that census would reveal regarding the state
of professional responsibility among business lawyers, other than the strong
suspicion that lawyers’ ethics and respect for law run along a lengthy
spectrum and that clients sniff out these preferences to match their own.
Much of this, as noted earlier, tends toward apathy.
There are a number of findings in behavioral ethics to support the idea that
lawyers would be particularly susceptible to slippery slopes. There is norm
ambiguity: the ample (and largely aspirational) principles of professional
responsibility for the public good sit in the shadow of counterbalancing
demands of zealous representation, confidentiality, and loyalty. Ample
research shows that people will cheat in the interest of significant others to a
greater extent than for their own good.50 Helping a client out via what is
processed cognitively as a benign and not unreasonable step into the ethical
gray area comes easily, even though it then moves the baseline for next time.
Lawyers covet being thought of as problem solvers for their clients, which
puts pressure on them to live up to expectations as a matter of professional
identity. Interviews with lawbreakers reveal how the first steps toward abject
criminality in business settings were often by people who did a little too much
not to let others down and then could not stop once committed to the course
of action (a form of cognitive dissonance).51
The often subjective nature of the law also makes the slope more slippery.
As with ethical precepts, vague legal principles invite interpretation in a selfserving fashion, without awareness of the biased construal. Yuval Feldman,
most notably, has done considerable work on the connection between legal
ambiguity and actions that set a course toward questionable judgment at least,
and a heightened risk of subsequent violations.52
Next is the matter of culture and group identity, which to an extent goes
back to self-definition as a reliable problem solver.53 There is a very famous
study of cheating behavior, where the subjects were all European bankers.54
50. See generally Francesca Gino et al., Self-Serving Altruism?: The Lure of Unethical
Actions That Benefit Others, 93 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285 (2013).
51. See Clinton Free & Pamela R. Murphy, The Ties That Bind: The Decision to Cooffend in Fraud, 32 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 18, 42–43 (2015); see also SOLTES, supra note 31,
at 154–55.
52. See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 984–85 (2009); see also FELDMAN, supra note 21, at 168–89.
53. SOLTES, supra note 31, at 134–35.
54. See generally Alain Cohn et al., Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking
Industry, 516 NATURE 86 (2014).
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Their conduct in the control conditions were little different from other
professionals—moderate cheating behavior at most.55 But one group of
subjects had their identities as bankers primed just before the testing, and this
group had higher rates of dishonesty.56 I am not aware that a comparable
study has been done of lawyers, but it would be interesting to see what that
would invoke cognitively. Whatever the finding, I think it would be a
glimpse into precisely how—in terms of ethics—the role of lawyering is
interpreted by lawyers themselves.
Tying all this together for our purposes is the concept of ethical
depletion.57 Research shows that being ethical is harder cognitive work than
giving in to temptation.58 Resisting temptation depletes energy over time;
tiredness and stress, in turn, increase the likelihood of further cheating.59
And corporate lawyers, by all accounts, inhabit workplaces filled with
stamina-challenging workloads, along with many other competitive stressors
tied to promotion, status, and compensation. Greater cheating is associated
with both falling just short of goals and achieving competitive success.60
The slippery slope would have less danger if the earliest, largely innocent,
steps are subject to corrective feedback in terms of being called out for the
behavior, or maybe even sanctioned. That is indeed an important
intervention in building good ethics and compliance. But here again, various
forces conspire against this kind of discipline. Various cognitive biases
affect supervisors and peers so as to make them less willing and able to
perceive and act on warning signs.61 Even when the conduct crosses the line
into actual illegality, enforcement resources and incentives are such that only
a small fraction of wrongdoing is detected and dealt with via sanction. In
that sense, as I have written elsewhere, the absence of negative feedback adds
ice to the slope by allowing ethical and legal risk-takers to claim greater
status and rewards.62 They become the winners, and their style of behavior—
the can-do, aggressive client-server—becomes something to be envied and
copied.
I realize that what I have done here is largely to make a somewhat updated
case for a behavioral approach to understanding corporate lawyers’ ethical
behavior—why good lawyers, however sanctimonious, may act less ethically
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See generally Anne Joosten et al., Being “in Control” May Make You Lose Control:
The Role of Self-Regulation in Unethical Leadership Behavior, 121 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2014);
David T. Welsh & Lisa D. Ordóñez, The Dark Side of Consecutive High Performance Goals:
Linking Goal Setting, Depletion, and Unethical Behavior, 121 ORGANIZATION BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 79 (2014);.
58. See, e.g., Joosten et al., supra note 57, at 1–2.
59. See id.
60. See Amos Schurr & Ilana Ritov, Winning a Competition Predicts Dishonest Behavior,
113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1754, 1757 (2016).
61. Francesca Gino & Max H. Bazerman, When Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The
Acceptability of Gradual Erosion in Others’ Unethical Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 708, 716 (2009).
62. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 503–04.
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than the professional ideal and do things somewhere along the spectrum of
bad acts. This still leaves open what they are conscious of as they
misbehave—the degree of culpable intent in any given case. But the more I
think about the slippery slope, the more I see it in terms of wearing down the
protective defenses of lawyers caught in high-stress settings. We should at
least think about this dynamic of professional apathy and the cultural effects
it is likely to generate.
II. IN-HOUSE: LESSONS FROM FINANCIAL ECONOMICS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
The British studies demonstrating such considerable ethical apathy
focused on lawyers in elite law firms.63 As noted, some portion of this can
be explained by shifts in the demand for legal services, which may not value
long-standing lawyer-client relationships so much as “just in time” specialist
interventions, robbing the attorney of the ability to develop the deep
familiarity with the client and the buildup of trust and credibility necessary
to take a strong ethical stance. My suspicion is that what we hear from these
lawyers is either a form of total depletion at the bottom of the slippery slope
or (from the more junior ones who have not yet succumbed) the expression
of an internal firm-wide culture that signals that form of ethical surrender.
That shift in private practice was accompanied by a rapid growth in the
power and authority of the in-house general counsel (and her team) as the
ones who select and supervise the outsiders.64 This role expansion also
brought with it the ability to internalize more expert competencies, such that
outside law firms had less to do (and thus would have to compete more
vigorously with each other for the externalized work).65 So, an obvious point
to consider is that whatever gatekeeping role might have been played by
outside counsel was internalized along with the competencies. In his
admirable writings on the contemporary role of the general counsel, Ben
Heineman makes the somewhat optimistic claim that in-house counsel
“operate seamlessly in business teams, gaining credibility by helping more
swiftly to achieve performance goals and by assisting business leaders
promote high integrity down the line inside the corporation,” the result of
which is a “smaller total legal spend (inside plus outside) for the company.”66
Heineman’s view runs up against the image of the in-house lawyer as the
CEO’s loyal consigliere, ready to do what it takes to promote the corporate
agenda, not to be anybody’s good conscience. While that caricature is surely
overdrawn, doubts about internal professional independence abound.67 For
this reason, in-house lawyers have been studied in depth. Most of the work
63. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
64. The contributions to this Colloquium by Eli Wald and Omari Scott Simmons
illuminate these developments.
65. See generally Gilson, supra note 17 (exploring the consequences of this shift).
66. Heineman, supra note 15; see also BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE INSIDE COUNSEL
REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION (2016).
67. See generally Kim, supra note 8.
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here uses the tools of sociology and cultural anthropology—learning what
goes on inside the firm by observing and asking. Robert Nelson and Laura
Beth Nielson’s tripartite division of in-house lawyers into “cops, counsel, and
entrepreneurs” is a justly famous rendering.68 More recently, however, the
study of lawyers in firms has become more quantitative and data-driven.
The results from this new wave of lawyer studies are interesting, if far from
determinative. Perhaps the best known is by Adair Morse, Wei Wang, and
Serena Wu, who estimate that general counsel are nearly half as important as
CEO preferences in determining outcomes over a range of activities
involving financial reporting, compliance monitoring, and business
development.69 This is a surprisingly large effect. Other work shows how
senior corporate lawyers affect accounting choices, reporting quality,
voluntary disclosure policy, and insider trading enforcement, mostly for the
better as general counsel prominence increases.70 A natural subject of
inquiry is whether the compensation packages of general counsel affect these
outcomes, especially when laden with stock options and other incentives.
Here, the authors show that high-powered incentives cause the general
counsel to redirect time and attention away from general compliance
monitoring toward strategic business development activity, which has a more
immediate payoff.71 As a result, they prevent some 25 percent fewer
breaches.72 So incentives do seem to matter.
This is important research for lawyers to pay attention to,73 even if some
of the assumptions about the law will occasionally cause legally trained
readers to cringe. Much of the discussion refers to the presumed gatekeeper
role of the in-house lawyer, suggesting that the good news in terms of
disclosure and the like demonstrates good gatekeeper behavior while
increasing risk tolerance, for example, evidences bad gatekeeping. But that
does not show whether the lawyer is doing anything more than keeping the
client out of trouble. Morse, Wang, and Wu even push back against the idea
that the shift in attention to more strategic functions is an abandonment of a
crucial gatekeeper role, claiming that if more attention to strategy is

68. See Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielson, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457,
460 (2000).
69. See generally Adair Morse et al., Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Strategic
Officers?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 847 (2016).
70. See, e.g., Justin J. Hopkins et al., Corporate General Counsel and Financial Reporting
Quality, 61 MGMT. SCI. 129, 130 (2015); Vikramaditya Khanna, An Analysis of Internal
Governance and the Role of the General Counsel in Reducing Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 282, 291–94 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018)
(reviewing empirical studies).
71. See Morse et al., supra note 69, at 874–75.
72. Id. at 851.
73. Not all of the analysis is optimistic. For a more jaundiced view of the evidence, see
generally S. Burcu Avci & H. Nejat Seyhun, Why Don’t General Counsels Stop Corporate
Crime?, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751 (2017). This draws from evidence on who reports corporate
crime, where in-house lawyers are not high on the list.
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profitable vis-à-vis the risks of not catching violations, there is nothing
necessarily wrong from a corporate governance perspective.74
Gatekeeping implies more, however, in terms of a commitment to lawabidingness (and perhaps other integrity-based values) whether or not
justified by cost-benefit calculations. We have no direct evidence in these
particular studies of payoffs one way or the other in terms of who benefits or
is harmed by more intense monitoring—the firm itself, its managers,
shareholders, or some more diffuse set of stakeholders?
That, of course, is the subject of corporate governance. While the law is
famously murky, there is plenty of rhetoric about the duty of (long-term)
shareholder wealth maximization that seems to suggest that individual
strategic choices are a matter of business judgment so long as they stay within
the known confines of the law.75 If so, then the studies seem to suggest that
all is (relatively) well, but any more capacious role for gatekeeping is
unrealistic.
But Heineman makes a good case for advice that merges law and ethics,
delivered with acute sensitivity to chain of command and business
constraints.76 Public companies, especially, can face harsh legal and
reputational consequences by mishandling a manageable threat so that it
turns into a disaster for the company. As we saw, there is data supporting
the view that general counsel do often act as gatekeepers, so long as their pay
packages are properly aligned with that function.77 Wise CEOs should
welcome their advice. By way of one provocative example, economists
provide evidence that attention to corporate social responsibility correlates
with more leniency in criminal prosecutions against corporations for
violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.78
So perhaps those in power should appreciate and do more to encourage
such ethical proactivity. But that style of general counsel work is contingent
on prioritization by the CEO and (arguably) key members of the board of
directors. Some of this is directly about agency costs inside the company:
the senior management team may, out of preference or pressure, be shifting
its focus to the short-term in ways that may instruct the general counsel to be
aggressive in response to all threats to the status quo, a threat-rigidity
response. In principle, the CEO may want wise counsel about the company’s
reputational and legal risk. In reality, that may be processed through a very
self-serving point of view. While that is surely a risk, there are pressures on
boards to take a stronger role in legal compliance and reforms (in board
compensation, for example) that could be employed to motivate this. Only
when a general counsel is willing to make the board fully informed of tough
situations will there be the support needed to pursue the best interest of the
74. See Morse et al., supra note 69, at 851.
75. See, e.g., infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. See generally Heineman, supra note 15.
77. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
78. See generally Harrison Hong et al., Crime, Punishment and the Value of Corporate
Social Responsibility (Oct. 14, 2019) (unpublishd manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492202 [https://perma.cc/J64C-AUJX].
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corporation rather than the self-interest of those caught in too deep—even if
the result of greater candor is to raise the board’s own liability exposure a
bit.79
While the evidence discussed above seems to be that significant numbers
of general counsel do their job well, how they do so remains opaque. The
culture channel surely matters. Elizabeth Pollman has written about the notunusual company (think Uber) that celebrates its role as the disrupter in
pushing the envelope—or deliberately crossing the line—on legal
compliance in the name of innovation.80 That was a backstory at Enron,
where there was a grandiose internal belief that the company was creating a
new paradigm for the delivery of energy around the world in the face of
entrenched habits and mindless rules.81 They deserved to be violated. Of
course, the slippery slope is at work here, with a large sucking machine at the
bottom speeding up the downward slide as ethical accommodations multiply.
This is just to emphasize the contingency of in-house gatekeeping. Many
corporate leaders will see the value; many others will not. So Heineman is
right to urge careful due diligence on general counsel candidates to look
deeply into the prevailing climate at any given opportunity. But that is very
hard—culture reveals itself only after rites of passage are faithfully
completed—especially for someone who really wants the job. And it does
not much matter if the person that anxious to be a good gatekeeper does not
get that job offer from the corporate thrill-seekers in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Essays about professional responsibility should try to end on a hopeful
note, so I cannot stop at the previous sentence. Nor do I want to fall prey to
naïve (or motivated) cynicism, which psychologists have identified as the
common overestimation of the selfishness (or apathy) of others so as to
rationalize responsive self-serving behavior by the observer.82 Good and bad
ethics are contagious, so that a downward spiral in morality can be
performative even if the underlying behavioral assumptions are inaccurate
and might someday be exposed as such.
That said, I do not think that the institutional structures exist to motivate
more than the minimum of gatekeeping by corporate lawyers. I keep coming
back to the image of the dimming amygdala. Law firm cultures are doing
other work that does not include drawing attention to public needs; individual
79. A reading of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Birmingham Retirement
& Relief System v. Good is a troubling example of a board that avoids personal liability
because they did not know enough and where the company’s lawyers’ lack of candor may
have contributed. 177 A.3d 47, 64 (Del. 2017). Obviously, good corporate governance
sometimes requires putting a board in a tough spot.
80. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709 (2019);
Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383
(2017).
81. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 10, at 37.
82. See generally Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between Actual and
Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53 (1998).
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lawyers become depleted in the face of stress. Clients are to be served, with
appreciation for the assignment, not skepticism about its motives. The
demand side has won triumphantly. So, the supply side (the corporate legal
profession itself) is not going to be the best place to find something better.
Rather, we have to look to the demand side, and pose the question of
whether corporate governance has something to add. The “business case for
ethics” or “ethics pays” approach is problematic, of course—justifying ethics
based on its payoff monetizes morality and deprives it of its core function in
promoting goodness as a stand-alone virtue. And so many scandals seem not
to give us much hope that good ethics is pervasive in highly competitive
organizations. I have given much of my scholarly attention to explaining
why that is so, thereby polishing my credentials as a pessimist.
But I believe that this perspective, while solidly based and descriptively
accurate, is socially constructed and thereby contingent. That’s where the
financial economics work is so interesting—there are, it seems, significant
numbers of firms that welcome good gatekeeping, just as there are many
more that do not. The corporate social license (i.e., the demands of
publicness) is increasingly difficult to earn, and easily put at risk. A good
general counsel is a prized commodity in managing that risk, if supported by
the CEO, the board, and—under the best of conditions—the internal
corporate culture. Ben Heineman’s model, in other words.
That model goes in competition with the opposite: the attack-dog general
counsel willing to do whatever it takes to win, supported by like-minded
bosses and more grease-laden cultures. Many will confidently place their
bets on the latter, and they may be right, especially in the zeitgeist of today’s
ill-spirited political economy.
But I’ve seen enough research on
sustainability, human capital, halo effects, and the like to, for now, hold onto
my chips and, if the odds make it worthwhile, even bet some on the good
guys. In other words, I can dimly see a future (without predicting one) where
the norms of corporate governance shift to favor firms with genuinely
influential general counsel who speak both law and ethics.83 If so, given the
demand-side dominance of the profession, the image of the lawyergatekeeper may be reawakened throughout the profession, shaking it out of
its apathy and nudging it off the slippery slope.

83. This is not an entirely new hope. See Harwell Wells, “All Lawyers Are Somewhat
Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle and the Modern Legal Profession, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 641, 660–
62 (2019).

